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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to address a fundamental question about higher education. If a 
country wanted to design a system of higher education, what would the optimal institutional 
structure of the system look like? This question is very broad so we limit our initial approach by 
analyzing one aspect of this question and ask how well a decentralized higher education system 
will perform. This paper is preliminary and does not provide an answer to this question; rather it 
attempts  to  lay  out  a  framework  for  thinking  about  this  question  using  existing  systems, 
principally the US, as a model for how such a system would work.  
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The purpose of this paper is to address a fundamental question about higher education. If a 
country wanted to design a system of higher education, what should the optimal institutional 
structure of the system look like?   
 
While the question is very broad and basic, it has important relevance in today‟s world. Many 
countries are enacting major reforms of their higher educational systems or are trying to build 
new systems of higher education. Former communist countries are experiencing pressures to 
reform their systems to meet the demands of their expanding market economies. Europe is 
engaged in the “Bologna Process” which is seeking to create a more uniform higher education 
system in Europe in the hopes that it will make it easier for students and faculty to interact.  
Many developing economies are attempting to build new higher education systems so they can 
participate in the global economy.    
 
This question is also relevant for policy decisions in the US. The historical development of the 
US system has created a number of anomalies. For example, what advantage is there to the 
present mix of private and public institutions? Why do some states provide generous support for 
higher education and others do not? 
 
The  approach  here  will  be  to  look  at  one  aspect  of  this  question.  While  many  institutional 
structures can be used in designing a system of higher education, one approach is to establish 
a very decentralized system where individual universities have a great deal of autonomy.  Then 
the question is similar to the question that Adam Smith raised in the context of a private market 
economy: Does a higher education system where independent universities seeking their own 
goals  produce  the  best  outcomes  for  society?  This  leads  to  further  questions  about  how 
government  should  govern  the  environment  for  higher  education  so  that  the  outcomes  are 
positive.  For  instance,  should  government  bring  anti-trust  actions  against  universities  that 
collude to determine what scholarship aid students will receive? 
 
A decentralized system is, of course, only one way of organizing a higher education system. 
Many countries have higher education systems that are dominated by public institutions which 
are closely monitored by a central authority.  A more complete analysis would compare and 
contrast the advantages and disadvantages of these two approaches. In this paper we will focus 
on decentralized systems, in later work we hope to compare an optimal decentralized system 
with a centralized hierarchically organized system. 
 
In trying to understand how an optimal decentralized higher education system might function, 
we rely heavily on the experience in the US to provide guidance in pointing out where problems 
are likely to arise. For example, the US system is dominated by private non-profit institutions 
and publicly supported institutions that have considerable autonomy.  We ask whether there are 
some inherent aspects of a decentralized higher education system that would justify having non-
profit and publicly supported institutions rather than for-profit institutions.  
 
If we are going to discuss what an optimal system should look like it is important to define how a 
higher education system will contribute to social welfare. This is a difficult problem because the 
mission of universities is complex. Universities not only teach students, they also engage in research and community service. In the next section we briefly discuss some of the issues 
involved in defining the social objectives for universities. In the following section we look at the 
goals of the individual university and why for-profit institutions may not be the best institutions 
for  pursuing  the  goals  of  higher  education.  In  this  section  we  also  argue  that  not  for-profit 
universities will seek prestige. We then discuss how this might influence their behavior. In the 
third section we turn to the revenue side and discuss the revenue constraint. From this we are 
able to describe a constrained maximization problem. Finally in the last section we outline some 
behavior of US universities and how they have reacted to changes in the economy during the 
last few decades.  
 
I.  Universities and Their Contribution to Social Welfare 
 
Like other institutions in the economy universities employ resources to provide a service to 
society. Bowen (1977) describes the mission of higher education as:   
 
Learning, in this sense, means knowing and interpreting the known (scholarship and 
criticism)  discovering  the  new  (research  and  related  activities),  and  bringing  about 
desired change in the cognitive and affective traits and characteristics of human beings 
(education). Learning is the chief stock in-trade of higher education. (p. 8) 
 
Bowen then goes on to describe different definitions of the purpose of higher education and in 
the following chapter describes how the goals of higher education can vary depending on the 
nature  of  the  society  in  which  it  is  placed.  As  an  example,  he  discusses  the  support  for 
collectivism vs.  individualism. Higher education can also produce negative outcomes, at least 
from the perspective of some people. For example, a liberal professorate may promote values 
that conservatives feel are inappropriate. 
 
In Bowen‟s view the Goals for Society (p. 59) are: 
 
a) Advancement of knowledge  
b) Discovery and encouragement of talent 
c) Advancement of social welfare (i.e. economic efficiency and growth, enhancements of 
national prestige, solution of social problems, etc.) 
d) Avoidance of negative outcomes for society 
 
Bowen  goes  on  to  say  that  many  of  these  goals  are  difficult  to  measure  and  may  not  be 
achievable  in  practice.  Furthermore,  because  of  cultural  differences,  these  goals  may  be 
defined differently in different countries.
1  
 
II. Goals of the University 
 
While  teaching  students  is  a  central  responsibility  of  all  higher  education  institutions,  many 
higher education institutions also engage in research and provide community outreach. These 
institutions  can  vary  greatly  in  terms  of  how  much  emphasis  they  give  to  these  differing 
                                                 
1 This raises some interesting questions when one observes that so many students seek out higher education 
opportunities in other countries.   Are these students seeking a cultural indoctrination that is different from what they 
would receive their home country?   
On the other hand, the Erasmus program in Europe encourages an  interchange of students coming from different 
countries to promote more cultural understanding. activities. In the U.S., the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching has developed 
a classification system for higher education institutions. The system was originally “organized 
around three fundamental questions: what is taught (Undergraduate and Graduate Instructional 
Program classifications), who are the students (Enrollment Profile and Undergraduate Profile), 
and what is the setting (Size & Setting). Another newer classification system (2006) “focuses on 
community engagement” (Carnegie website). This system forms the basis of the classification 
system used by the U.S. News college ranking system. Institutions more or less compete in 
markets that are defined by this system.  For example, in the U.S. News college ranking there 
are geographical groupings of colleges that do not compete at the national level. The goals of 
the institutions in different categories can differ significantly. This diversity is an important aspect 
of higher education in the US. 
 
For-Profit vs. Nonprofit Institutions 
 
In the U.S. there are basically three types of higher education institutions: private non-profit, 
private for-profit and public.  Historically, private for-profit institutions have been a small part of 
the higher education system and these schools mostly concentrated on technical training. That 
has  been  changing  in  recent  years  with  the  establishment  of  schools  like  the  University  of 
Phoenix which is now the largest university in the U.S. with 160,000 students.   
 
This  raises  the  question  of  why  higher  education  is  so  dominated  by  nonprofit  and  public 
institutions. The most common argument is spelled out nicely by Winston (1999): 
 
In a seminal article, Henry Hansmann (1980) identified the legal and economic rationale 
for the nonprofit firm as a situation in which, because of asymmetries of information, the 
buyer is highly vulnerable to sellers' opportunism. 
 
Markets  like  these  are  sometimes  referred  to  as  "trust  markets"  because  of  that 
vulnerability.  The  nonprofit  structure  of  suppliers  encourages  the  honest,  if  profit 
sacrificing  behavior,  that  justifies  trust.  By  reducing  incentives  for  the  opportunistic 
behavior, nonprofits become the preferred suppliers in certain settings: they increase the 
probability -and the confidence of donors or buyers- that they're getting what they are 
paying for, tending to offset the contract failure inherent in such asymmetric markets.   
 
Rothschild and White (1993) take issue with this position. They point out that trade schools, 
legal and medical practices and hospitals have similar problems of asymmetric information but 
for-profit institutions operate in these areas. They argue that a better explanation for why the 
small presence of for-profits institutions is the lack of human capital markets.  Because it  is 




Another possible reason for the development of this sector along nonprofit lines is historical. 
The cost of educating a student in the U .S.  is much higher than the tuition charges. The 
difference is made up for by endowment and gift income, pubic support and cross subsidization 
from other university activities. With such a wide gap it would be difficult for a for-profit institution 
to enter the market. Following this argument to its logical conclusion, one would expect for-profit 
                                                 
2  This argument depends, of course, on the presumption that more intense competition in a higher 
education market with for-profit institutions will not force the cost of education down enough that 
education will become more affordable. 
 institutions to enter the sector to compete in areas where other sources of revenue to support 
the cost of education were small.  
 
Another argument for nonprofit higher education institutions places more emphasis on the role 
of research. Bok (2003) expresses concern about the commercialization of higher education 
institutions. He does not condemn all activities between universities and businesses. Indeed, 
joint ventures with business can produce real advances, but he is worried about corruption of 
academic  values.  He  sees  universities  playing  an  important  role  in  evaluating  commercial 
products.  As  the  world  becomes  more  complex,  and  it  is  harder  for  the  general  public  to 
evaluate these products, it is important to have in society a neutral observer who can be trusted. 
When businesses provide extensive funding for research and university researchers become 
increasingly dependent on this funding, it is harder for the university to portray itself as a neutral 
observer.  He  is  particularly  concerned  about  the  funding  in  the  medical  area,  where,  for 
example, pharmaceutical companies fund laboratories to evaluate new products.
3 
 
The rapid growth of schools like the University of Phoenix suggests that there may be a niche 
which is not being filled by the other types of institutions . The University of Phoenix uses bare-
bone facilities, with lecture plans prepared by the central administration. An effort is made to 
present classes at times when students will find it easiest to attend class. This structure is 
considerably different from the approach of either private non-profit or public institutions. Since 
the private for-profit sector is still relatively small, and there are so many unresolved issues 
surrounding private non-profit and public institutions, we will focus on latter.
4 
 
Goals of Nonprofits 
 
As  argued  by  Hansmann  (1980)  nonprofit  institutions  are  distinguishable  from  for-profit 
institutions by a "nondistribution constraint". Nonprofit firms still must be concerned that their 
revenues exceed their costs.  Still nonprofits can act in ways that profit maximizing firms are 
unlikely to do. They can overpay for inputs, like overpaying managers. They can shift “profits‟ 
from  one  internal  operation  to  another  in  order  to  support  an  activity  that  cannot  generate 
enough revenue on its own (A profit maximizing firm would abandon the unprofitable activity). 
This allows the nonprofit to pursue goals that would not meet the test of the market.  
 
Nonprofits may also experience less outside pressure because they cannot be taken over in a 
capital market (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Greater weight will be placed on the outside board to 
                                                 
3 It is not clear that universities must play this role. There are other institutions in society which could 
perform this function.   Certainly the government has taken on this task in many areas, including product 
safety and evaluation of the effectiveness of pharmaceuticals.  But government also has its own 
weaknesses. There is a large literature on the capture of regulatory bodies by the sector that they are 
supposed to control. 
 
If universities are to play the role of neutral observers in the commercial area, do academic values also 
extend to other areas of society where neutral observers would also be valuable as the world becomes 
more complex?   It is often argued that universities, or at least faculty members, have strong biases in 
political debates.  It is not clear that being nonprofit institutions has much impact here, although there may 
be more political influence on public institutions than private institutions. 
 
 
4 It can be argued that the University of Phoenix is more like a technical school than a liberal arts college or 
university.   Like a technical school its cliental is older, mostly working, with a clearer vision of the skills that they 
want to acquire. impose this discipline, but boards are not always up to the task. Thus nonprofit institutions have 
constraints but the market imposes less discipline than would be imposed on a profit maximizing 
firm.
5 (Winston (1999)) 
 
A higher education system made up entirely of nonprofit firms would act very differently from 
Adam Smith‟s model of a decentralized market economy. In Smith‟s model the pursuit of profit 
encourages  firms  to  be  responsive  to  market  demand  and  new  entry  occurs  when  profit 
opportunities arise. In a world of nonprofits the incentives for entry must be very different. For 
example, new institutions might be created for religious reasons. This has been an important 
motivation  for  new  universities  in  the  US.  The  story  told  behind  the  creation  of  Sabanci 
University, a new private university in Istanbul, is that the founder was convinced that starting a 
prestigious university would be a way of being remembered in future generations.
6 
 
Nonprofits will also have less incentive to expand. The rapid growth of student  enrollments in 
the post-World War II period has been concentrated in the public sector. Winston (2001) argues 
that because the cost of educating a student ex ceeds the tuition students pay ,  expanding 
enrollments is not in the interest of the nonprofit private college or university. Public universities 
have expanded more to meet this demand because their funding comes from the public sector, 
which is pressuring them to expand and providing at least some of the funding to permit them to 
expand.  
 
Because they are not subject to the same market pressures  as a firm in perfect competition , 
higher education institutions have the advantage (disadvantage) of having additional freedom, 
within limits, to set their own agenda. Whether universities pursue objectives which satisfy a 
social purpose and efficiently use the resources available to them will depend importantly on 
what these goals are. 
 
Several researchers have att empted to identify goals for universities. A common element in 
most of this research is that prestige is an important goal. Garwin (1980) lays out a formal utility 
maximizing model similar to a household utility maximizing model where there are inputs into  a 
household production function.   His utility function is: 
 
(1)   u = u(pr, studqual, stud#, Z) 
 
where pr is prestige, studqual is the quality of the students, stud# is the number of students, and 
Z is a vector of other factors  (p. 26-28). He then adds several other equations that determine 
these variables. For instance, prestige is based on some weighted average of the prestige of 
various departments in the university. He then estimates equations to see if he can find the 
expected signs. All of the expected signs in this equation are positive.
7 
 
                                                 
5 This is not to argue that all firms are profit maximizing firms.  To the extent that firms have market power 
and protect themselves from takeover, they also have more freedom to pursue goals other than pure 
profit maximization. 
6 The story goes that Sabanci, who was the head of the largest industrial group in Turkey, was asked  if had ever 
heard of  Stanford University.   He was then asked if he had heard of Leland Stanford.   The reason that Leland 
Stanford, a railroad magnate who drove the „golden spike‟ for the transcontinental railroad, is remembered is 
because Stanford University is named after him.    
7 Note that the positive sign on student numbers contradicts our earlier argument that universities have an incentive 
to limit enrollments. Expressing the objective function as a utility function gives the model some degrees of freedom.  
He points out that different schools will put more emphasis on different factors. Private research 
universities would put more emphasis on prestige and student quality. Large public universities 
would put emphasis on expanding student enrollments. 
 
Brewer, et. al. (2002) also include prestige in their objective function, but they make a distinction 
between prestige and reputation. Reputation, according to their definition, is something that can 
be evaluated more directly and has a shorter half-life. Reputation is based on such factors as 
whether  students  seeking  employment  in  certain  fields  are  likely  to  be  satisfied  with  the 
university. This is something that can be determined soon after graduation. Information about 
the likelihood of future employment in a particular field can also be obtained by looking at the 
experience of recent graduates. Reputation is particularly important because of the information 
asymmetries that exist in the education market. 
 
Prestige, according to Brewer, et. al, is a much harder to measure. Prestige is built around three 
prestige generators: student quality, research and sports. With the possible exception of sports, 
these are all harder to measure in the short-run. For this reason, the half-life of prestige is 
longer. They note that prestige plays an important role in the US News rankings where 25% of 
the score is based on the opinions of administrators in other colleges and universities in the 
same category. 
 
For  Brewer  et.  al.  the  distinction  between  reputation  and  prestige  is  important.  Using  their 
definitions reputation is more directed at „consumer service‟ where the customers are students.  
Universities which are more concerned about reputation focus on enhancement of teaching. 
Those universities who seek more prestige have a broader agenda which, most importantly, 
includes  research.  These  prestige-seeking  universities  also  have  a  broader  set  of  revenue 
sources, including research funding and alumni giving. 
 
Brewer, et.al. argue that prestige competition can be very expensive in terms of the investments 
that universities must make, and they wonder whether these investments are socially justifiable. 
They suggest that these investments are a factor in the increasing cost of higher education and 
in their surveys they observe universities which are more financially fragile because they are 
prestige-seeking.   
 
Their treatise is useful in highlighting the diversity in American higher education, but they do not 
have a clear model of competition in the higher education sector nor do they have a well defined 
social  welfare  function.  Without  these,  the  arguments  they  make  for  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses of the US higher education system are not as convincing as they might otherwise 
be.  
 
In recent years an important barometer of higher education success is the US News rankings of 
colleges and universities. The first rankings were published in 1983 (after Garvin (1980)) and 
have led to numerous other rankings of higher education systems worldwide. Intended as a 
source of information for students looking for a college, the rankings are now used by schools to 
measure and promote their success. Much like the polls listing the top collegiate football teams, 
the rankings provide an easy way for the general public to get a sense of the relative reputation 
of various higher education institutions.  
 
While it is difficult to get an exact measure of the importance these rankings have on actual 
decision-making within higher education institutions, Monk and Ehrenberg (1999) studied the 
impact of a change in ranking on the top private universities and colleges. They found that with a five point improvement in the rankings a school received more applications, rejected more 
students, average SAT scores of the admitted class improved and the school could reduce the 
level of institutional grant aid.  
 
There are also strong indirect indications that the rankings are having an important impact on 
institutions. The rankings are controversial both within and outside of academia.
8 When the pay 
of the president of the Arizona State University was explicitly linked to the US News rankings, it 
was acknowledged  that while an explicit connection between pay and rankings was unusual, it 
also  noted    that  “the  rankings  are  „a  very  common  part  of  the  conversation‟  among  board 
members about presidential performance and goals” in universities.
9 (Jaschik, 2007) 
 
The linkage between the rankings and evaluation of university presidents can be compared to 
the linkage between corporate executives and stock market performance through the granting of 
options. When there is a clear measure of performance that affects the compensation of the 
leaders  of  an  organization,  this  will  have  an  important  influence  on  the  direction  of  the 
organization.  
 
The impact is also significant for professional schools. In a recent article the dean of the 
University of Cincinnati School of Law is quoted as saying.  
 
 “It is hard to overestimate the effect law school rankings have on everyday campus 
life… Students worry about how a ranking will affect their chances of future employment.  
Faculty worry about whether a drop in rankings will make it more difficult to publish in 
law reviews.  Deans feel that they will be judged by how many places up or down the 
school moves in the rankings.”  (Edwards, 2008, p. 40) 
 
Further evidence of the importance of the US News rankings is the attempt by the Annapolis 
Group, an organization of leading independent liberal arts colleges, to forgo participation in the 
US News surveys. Members of this group feel that the rankings provide incentives for colleges 
to  distort  their  priorities,  in  part  because  of  pressure  from  trustees,  and  make  expenditure 
decisions that are not in the best interest their colleges (Hoover, 2007).  
 
This anecdotal evidence suggests that while a high ranking is not the only goal that directs 
resource  decisions  in  nonprofit  higher  education  institutions,  the  rankings  are  an  important 




The Role of University Rankings 
 
Competition  for  higher  ranking  has  two  important  implications  for  judging  whether  the 
decentralized higher educational system in the US is meeting society‟s needs. First, if higher 
education institutions are being judged on the basis of their ranking, they will meet the needs of 
society only if the criteria used to rank institutions are consistent with society‟s goals. To the 
extent that the goal of the ranking system created by US News is to provide information to 
                                                 
8 See http://www.library.uiuc.edu/edx/rankbib.htm for a short bibliography of some of the articles about s ranking 
issues. 
9 This quotation is drawn from a statement by Charles Quatt whose company provides  advice on compensation 
issues, but did not advise the Arizona State University board. 
10 For additional examples of the impact of the rankings on decision-making in colleges and universities see 
Ehrenberg (2002) prospective students, it is an attempt to overcome information asymmetries that exist in the 
market place. Second, the structure of the competition among higher education institutions is 
like a tournament. In this sense it differs from the standard market model of a competitive firm.   
 
1) US News Ranking Criteria 
 
The US News Ranking criteria are peer assessment (reputation) (25%), student retention (20% 
in  national  universities  and  liberal  arts  colleges  and  25%  in  master's  and  baccalaureate 
colleges),  faculty  resources  (20%),  student  selectivity  (15%),  financial  resources  (10%), 
graduation rate performance (5%; only in national universities and liberal arts colleges), and 
alumni giving (5%) (US News and World Report, 2008). As can be seen from the list, there is a 
heavy emphasis here on input measures rather than output measures. This reflects the difficulty 
in measuring the output of services industries in general. 
 
The heaviest weight in the index is on reputation which is a survey of college presidents, deans 
and admission officers. The survey is designed to “to account for intangibles such as faculty 
dedication to teaching” (US News and World Report, 2008). While administrators probably know 
more about other universities than the average college applicant coming out of high school, it is 
unclear what is really being measured here. In fact many administrators refuse to fill out the 
form because they do not want to engage in a „beauty contest.”  (Ehrenberg, 2002) 
 
Student retention is a goal for which all universities should strive, but like other criteria in the US 
News rankings, attempting to achieve a high score may actually lower education values. Much 
like the rules passed by the NCAA to ensure that athletes are also students, higher student 
retention rates can be achieved by watering down the curriculum. So it is not clear that an 
outside pressure to increase student retention rates will actually improve the education that 
students will receive. 
 
Faculty  resources  are  another  important  criteria  used  by  US  News.  Faculty  resources  are 
measured by class size (i.e. number of classes under 20 students and number of classes with 
more than 50 students), faculty salaries, highest degree earned by faculty, proportion of full-
faculty faculty and student/faculty ratios. As with the goal of student retention, these goals are 
worthy, but having them imposed from outside may cause distortions in the way institutions 
allocate resources. 
 
The fourth criterion is student selectivity. There are many ways to distort this statistic from early 
decision programs which increase yield rates  (i.e.  number of students who accept  offers of 
admission) to dropping SAT scores as part of the application process.
11   
 
US colleges promoted their student selectivity long before the  US News ranking system so 
having highly selective universities is not a new aspect of the decentralized higher education 
system in the US. Epple, et.al. (2006) provide theoretical support for the argument that tracking 
students by ability has advantages when the educational experience depends on peer ability. 
Sallee,  et.al.  (2008)  make  a  similar  argument  when  there  are  complementarities  between 
resource expenditure and ability.
12  
                                                 
11 See Ehrenberg (2002) for a discussion of these strategies. 
12 Sallee et. al. (2008) carry out an exercise similar to ours in that they analyze how a social planner would choose 
the number of  higher education institutions a country should have, and how students of different abilities should be 
allocated among these universities.  Our goal is similar but our focus is more institutional.  We are not interested just  
Having a system which tracks the best students into a subset of universities, however, has 
conflicted with other societal goals. For instance, there have been concerns about affirmative 
action (diversity) and the admission of low-income students. Attempts by universities to maintain 
high levels of selectivity based on student SAT test scores and high school performance often 
run counter to these objectives
13. Indeed, some university presidents have bemoaned the fact 
that the goals of diversity and admission of low income students are harder to achieve given the 
pressures they feel in trying to improve their standing in the US News rankings (Hoover, 2007)
14 
 
The next criterion is financial resources. Here  US News calculates the amount of instructional 
resources available per student (sport, dorm and hospital costs are not included). In an indirect 
way these figures include research expenditures at the university so universities that have high 
research budgets would do well on this criterion.
15 
 
The last two criteria receive a relative small weight so we will not elaborate on them further. The 
analysis of the other five criteria shows the weaknesses in a system where attempts are made 
by an external agency to quantify the goals that higher education institutions should seek. This 
is not a problem unique to higher education. It is similar to the problem that confounds any 
organization which tries to quantify its goals and gives rewards to units within the organization 
that successfully meet the quantitative goals.
16 
 
In  a  quantitative  measurement  system  it  is  particularly  difficult  to  measure  aspects  of 
performance which are not easily quantifiable. The US News survey attempts to do this with its 
peer survey, but the results of the survey have met with a skeptical response. 
 
The  purpose  of  the  ranking  is  to  provide  students  with  information  on  their  college  choice 
decision. While there is some controversy about this aspect of the ranking system, the real 
problem is that it is hard for colleges to ignore the rankings. It has become a instrument for 
measuring  their  success,  particularly  with  trustees  who  are  looking  for  ways  of  judging  the 
performance  of  the  institution  they  are  monitoring.  Thus  the  rankings  are  being  used  for  a 
purpose for which they are not designed.   In an environment where information asymmetries 
are a serious concern, the rankings partially fill this gap, but, perhaps, at a cost to society in 
terms of how higher education institutions are being managed. 
 
The US News rankings are an American response to the absence of good information about 
universities and how they are performing. Recently other rankings have appeared which rank 
universities  worldwide.  One  popular  ranking  is  the  Academic  Ranking  of World  Universities 
                                                                                                                                                       
in the number of universities and student allocation among them.  We are also interested in the incentives that 
motivate decisions made by universities and how these decisions affect economic outcomes 
13 The tracking that occurs at the university level would be very controversial if it were carried out in elementary or 
secondary schools.  
14 In their empirical work on US universities, Epple, et.al. (2006) find that universities do care about the 
income level of their students and “thus tend to subsidize students from families with lower incomes.” (p. 887) 
15 This criterion creates some strange incentives for universities. Ehrenberg (2002) relates a situation 
where he was at a meeting with a trustee at Cornell, where he teaches and has been an administrator.  
The trustee wanted to control expenses, but Ehrenberg had to point out that this would hurt Cornell‟s 
placement in the rankings since this would reduce Cornell‟s per student instructional resources.  This is 
clearly a perverse incentive from an efficiency perspective and will increase the resources society needs 
for higher education.. 
16 See Miller (1984 ) for a discussion of how the problems created by quantitative goals set by Soviet central 
planners and similar to the problems in any large organization.  published by the Institute of Higher Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. In an optimal 
decentralized higher education system, there may be better ways to manage the problem of 
information asymmetries, but given the importance of these rankings in the mindset of so many 
institutions and the absence of an alternative way of overcoming the information asymmetry 
problem, we will include this notion in describing the goal function for the university.  
 
These rankings cannot be the only element in the university‟s objective function, however. The 
US News rankings focus directly on the needs of students and do not attempt to measure other 
goals (i.e. research, etc.) to which universities aspire. So the rankings relate to part to only part 
of a university‟s mission, but we include them as part of the objective function. 
 
2) Nature of the competition 
 
The competition over rankings is different from the competition in a normal competitive market. 
It is more like a tournament where there are winners. This raises an important question as to 
whether this competition leads to a overinvestment or underinvestment in resources. There are 
now two related literatures on this topic. One literature begins with Lazear and Rosen (1981). 
They  describe  conditions  in  labor  markets  where  manipulation  of  the  reward  structure  can 
create  an  environment  where  basic  efficiency  criteria  are  satisfied.  This  result  depends  on 
various assumptions about the information structure of the environment, risk characteristics of 
the players, and the nature of the uncertainty. The related literature is the „rat-race‟ literature 
which usually makes reference to Akerlof (1976) as an important early article.  
 
In a more recent paper about labor market issues in sports, Rosen (2001) describes the basic 
relationship between these two approaches:  
 
Rank  order  considerations  that  determine  outcomes  can  create  excessive  personal 
incentives  to  improve  one's  skills:  a  player  with  greater  skills  imposes  negative 
externalities on rivals because others must react defensively to preserve their relative 
ranking. In most other labour market contexts, the decision of one person to acquire 
more human capital has only pecuniary externalities on others: personal decisions are 
properly internalised by market prices. In sports, the attempts of one player to gain a 
competitive advantage put direct pressure on rivals to keep up. Since each contestant 
does not value the extra costs imposed on others, there is much 'rat race' potential in 
sport (Akerlof, 1976). An extreme case is when the customer value of the contest is 
completely relative and depends exclusively on rank of contestants (Frank and Cook, 
1995), that is, on who wins irrespective of skill or quality of play. In this case any attempt 
by contestants to improve their skills is a pure arms race and socially wasteful. Arms 
limitations  treaties  are  necessary  to  avoid  excess  buildup  of  skill.  Of  course  when 
absolute quality considerations totally dominate value, these investments are socially 
efficient (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) and arms limitation is unwarranted. In sports the truth 
usually lies somewhere in between. Lately some economists have stressed the rank and 
relative aspects of competition rather than the skill or quality of performance aspects, but 
empirical evidence on the extent of overinvestment is lacking. Nor has anyone spelled 
out how it could be ascertained. (p. F62) 
 
We would argue that a similar analysis is needed to determine whether there is an under or 
overinvestment by colleges and universities.
17  
                                                 
17 In a later section we argue that academic departments also engage in a similar rank order competition.   A similar 
model would be needed to determine whether this competition leads to an appropriate level of investment.   
Goals and Incentives for Universities in a Decentralized Environment 
 
When  looking  at  the  goals  and  incentives  associated  with  a  decentralized  environment  for 
universities, we have relied heavily on using the US as a model for what such an environment 
might look like. We must ask, however, to what degree an optimal decentralized system will 
follow the outline of the US system and to what degree it might differ. 
 
There  appears  to  be  a  good  argument that  asymmetric  information  problems  will  lead  to  a 
sector which is largely dominated by nonprofit institutions.
18 If this is true, then the goals of 
nonprofit higher educational institutions need to be described and the organization of   higher 
education competition needs to be analyzed.  
 
The  US  experience  suggests  that  the  info rmation  asymmetry  problems  are  important 
determinant of how this competition proceeds and that ranking systems like US News are being 
used  to  overcome  these  information  asymmetry  problems.
19  This is clearly a second best 
solution, but the spread of ranking systems to other countries suggests that it may be difficult to 
find other methods to overcome these problems.  If this is so, then we need to consider  the 
potential  problems  with  these  systems  in  terms  of  how  well  the  incentives  they  give  to 
universities may enhance or distort the objective of meeting society‟s needs. To the extent they 
encourage inappropriate behavior, through the goals they promote or through the competitive 
nature of the environment they create (i.e. ranking tournament), this may be a fundamental 
weakness of a decentralized system of higher education.  
 
Thus far we have explored the goals of the university as they relate more or less directly to the 
teaching mission of the university. In the next section we explore issues related to the research 
mission. 
 
 Research Mission  
 
Research is an important part of the mission of research universities in the United States, much 
less so at other higher education institutions. It is totally absent from the mission of for-profit 
institutions like the University of Phoenix. 
 
There were dramatic changes in the relationship between teaching and research in the sciences 
that came about with the establishment of the University of Berlin, now Humboldt University, in 
1810. As the short history of Humboldt University states: 
 
…the foundation concept which Wilhelm von Humboldt had put forward made it the 
"mother of all modern universities". 
                                                 
18 Courant, et. al  (2006) point out that almost all the for-profit schools provide either technical training where the 
education needs are more narrowly defined or  business training like the University of Phoenix.   Liberal arts 
education, which is much harder to evaluate, is provided by nonprofits. 
19 There have been suggestions that a weakness in the US News rankings is that US News is a for-profit organization 
and this gives the magazine the incentive to change the rankings so they can sell more magazines.  An alternative 
possibility would be to have the rankings provided by a nonprofit organization like Consumer Reports.  The 
Department of Education is also trying to develop a data base  College Opportunities Online Locator, or COOL, that 
will provide students with information that they can use for making college choices.   See Chronicle  of Higher 
Education (2006) This  concept  envisaged  a  "Universitas  litterarum"  which  would  achieve  a  unity  of 
teaching and research and provide students with an all-round humanist education. This 
concept spread throughout the world and gave rise to the foundation of many universities 
of the same type over the following 150 years.  (Humboldt, 2008) 
While continental European universities moved away somewhat from this model as research 
institutes separate from universities spread, American universities expanded on this idea. (Ofer, 
2007) 
 
For many universities academic research has became an important part of the mission of the 
university  and  can  be  a  source  of revenue  to  the  university  as  well  as  an  important factor 
affecting the reputation of the university. Research reputation varies across departments since 
most research is carried out within an academic discipline. For example, when Garwin (1980) 
presents his utility function for universities he explicitly makes the prestige of the university a 
function of the prestige of individual departments. His empirical work then utilizes surveys done 
by the American Council of Education on the performance of individual academic departments 
to build his prestige equations. Following his lead we could write a prestige function:   
 




n)     
 
Unlike Garwin, who used this to define the prestige variable in his equation, we envision this 
capturing specifically research prestige. At the same time we recognize that research prestige 
could influence factors as such as the reputation factor in surveys like  US News which are 
directed  towards  guiding  students  in  making  decisions  regarding  the  education  function  of 
universities. 
 
We could therefore imagine a model of university behavior where: 
 
U(Ranking (pr), pr)) 
 






where the ranking variable is some explicit ranking like US News or the Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University rankings.  
 
Academic departments are also ranked by various surveys including a ranking by the National 
Research Council (NRC) (http://graduate-school.phds.org/). These rankings are usually based 
on some kind of publication criteria. These rankings can be especially important in recruiting 
graduate  students  since  undergraduate  students  often  consult  their  teachers  for  advice  on 
applying to graduate programs.
20 
 
By writing the utility function in this general way, we are leaving open the possibility that some 
higher education institutions may put a very small weight on research ; others a very  large 
weight.  
 
                                                 
20 The NRC system allows students to weigh different criteria in coming up with a ranking of departments they are 
considering.   Various criteria include citations, size of department, reputation of the department, selectivity and 
diversity. In Britain the evaluation of research productivity has a more explicit role in the utility function of 
universities and how they are managed. In 1985 the British established a Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) where funding for the next four or five years from the state Funding Councils 
would be based on the RAE. The RAE is an evaluation done by peers within each discipline and 
university departments are rated on the basis of the evaluation. The purpose of the RAE is to 
manage government research funding more efficiently (Henkel, 1999). 
 
Under this system departments decide if they want research funding. If they want the funding, 
then they must participate in the process. The departments are graded from one to five stars.  
Rising or falling in their rankings can have serious repercussions for the department and the 
university: 
 
In less than a decade it has become one of the most important influences on academic 
institutions,  directly,  through  providing  the  basis  of  state  funding  allocations,  and 
indirectly, as the mediator of information that enables the profession to accord status 
and the market to bestow its custom. (Henkel, 1999, p. 120)
21 
 
As with any system of this type there are advantages and disadvantages. The system has been 
criticized because of the short time horizons between RAE evaluations discourage longer term 
projects; the difficulty in doing interdisciplinary research because the evaluations are done on a 
department basis; and because of the structure of the  RAE there is more separation between 
„research faculty‟ and „teaching faculty‟. 
 
Under either an American system, which has less explicit rankings, or the British system with 
the REA ranking system, departments are participating in a tournament for prestige in their 
academic discipline; much like the university is participating in its own ratings game. The same 
questions will arise in this context as to whether there is an under or overinvestment in these 
activities as a result of this competition.  
 
III. Funding of University Activities 
 
Thus far we have analyzed the utility function of the university, but we have not addressed the 
question of the resource constraints.  Universities receiving funding from four basic sources:  
student tuition, research funding, public support, and private giving. What percentage of their 
support they receive from these various sources can vary enormously. For example, if public 
support for universities varies significantly across countries. In 2005, public support was  over 
80% in France and Germany whereas public support represented around 35% of funding in the 
US and around 21% in South Korea.  (OECD, 2007, Chart B3.2)    
 
Depending  on  the  source  of  funding  and  how  important  it  is  to  the  overall  funding  of  the 
university, each constituency can put pressure on universities in different ways. 
 
 
A.  Student Tuition 
 
In  the  US,  even  though  student tuition  is  very  high  relative  to  world  standards,  tuition  only 
covers a part of the total cost of educating a student even at private colleges and universities. 
                                                 
21 In some ways this situation is similar to the situation in world financial markets.   The World Bank and the IMF 
do detailed country studies.  Once they give their imprimatur to a country‟s financial condition, it is much easier for 
the country to obtain funding from private  markets. Rothchild  and  White  (1995)  address  this  question  in  a  model  where  outputs  depend  on 
consumer inputs. The notion here is that students benefit from the presence of other students of 
a particular type. They find that the tuition payments from a student will depend on what kind of 
inputs they provide. For example, if diversity is considered a positive input, then students from a 
minority group which is in high demand would pay less tuition. Their tuition would be equal to 




As the  authors  point out, their model does not explain important aspects of the US higher 
education system. While the model does explain why some students going to the same 
university pay different tuition (through scholarships), they have no data to support the notion 
that the differences are due to the factors in their model. Furthermore, the model does not 
explain why the same tuition is charged for  courses within the same college even when costs 
can differ significantly. Additionally, the model does not explain the small varia tion in tuition 
charges across widely different private colleges and universities (i.e. small colleges and large 
universities).
23   
 
The fact that universities are sensitive to price competition is evident in the establishment of 
scholarship cartels like the one that brought anti-trust action against several Ivy League schools 
in the later 1980s. Other similar scholarship cartels exi sted among the Great Lakes Colleges 
and a group of 8 women‟s colleges (mostly in the South) (White and Rothchild, 1993). The 
existence of several of these groups also points to the fact that the student market is highly 
segmented. Some colleges and universities compete on a national level, but most compete 
within a particular region. 
 
B. Research Funding 
 
Economic efficiency requires that universities promote research which is socially productive. 
Universities have played a role in society where there has generally been more tolerance for 
research which may not have dividends for a long period of time. This makes it extremely hard 
to evaluate the benefits of university research. 
 
Funding for academic research comes from a number of sources. An important source is the 
allocation of resources within the university itself. In many universities there is an expectation 
that  an  important  part  of  faculty  time  will  be  spent  on  research.  To  the  extent  that  other 
responsibilities,  like  teaching,  are  reduced  to  make  room  for  research,  the  university  is 
reallocating resources to the research mission. 
 
Not  all  universities  engage  in  serious  research  and  not  all  faculty  at  research  universities 
engage in research. An important question is where to draw these lines in an economically 
efficient way.  This is what the British RAE system attempts to do. First, universities designate 
whether or not they wish to be considered for research funding. Next, they identify which faculty 
are research faculty. This second designation is based on the number of research publications 
by a faculty member. The result has been a separation within institutions of teaching versus 
research faculty (Henkel, 1999). 
 
                                                 
22 The authors are well aware that a weakness in the model is that it assumes profit maximizing universities that are 
in competitive zero profit equilibrium. 
23 They point particularly to business and law schools where the tuition differences are small compared to the 
differences in salaries that graduates can expect. While no formal funding approach like this exists within the US, the publication of peer reviewed 
research work plays an important role in evaluating the research productivity of faculty. Thus 
there is pressure on academics to pursue a research agenda which is likely to be positively 
reviewed. 
 
Some research is also funded by outside agencies. Funding for research also puts pressure on 
universities  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  funding  agencies.  While  faculty  have  a  great  deal  of 
freedom to decide what areas of research they want to pursue, the funding of research can 
influence the direction of research activity. This is a particularly important issue in areas like 
science where research funding is needed to pursue a research agenda.   
 
Government has been an important source of research funding in many countries, although the 
process for providing funding can differ greatly across countries. As we have seen above, the 
UK distributes funds based on the REA system. (France?). In the US there are several funding 
sources including the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Health (which are a 
peer  reviewed systems),  the  Department of Defense  and others.  Depending on the agency 
support may be for basic research or work that is closely related to the mission of the agency. In 
the US state and local governments also support activities that are of particular interest to their 
constituencies.  
 
For the most part research done for government agencies is published in the public domain.
24 In 
recent years there has also been more work supported by the private sector.  Because firms in 
the private sector hope to profit from the discoveries that result from the research they support, 
their goals often conflict with the goals of academics who wish to disseminate their results to the 
research community.  
 
A related issue is the patenting of new discoveries and the rights associated with potential 
commercialization. Some universities, such as Oxford University ( Cook, et. al. 2008) have set 
up special units to bring together commercial interests and university researchers, and work out 
contracts that are agreeable to both parties. A spur to patenting by university researchers in the 
US is the Bayh-Dole Act passed in 1980. The act gave universities the right to patent and 
license inventions resulting from federally funded research. Since the passage of the act, some 
US universities have set up special units to promote licensing of discoveries. Except in a few 
instances these efforts have been less lucrative for universities then they hoped. (Bok, 2003?) 
 
Of particular concern to Bok is other ways in which the private sector has intruded on the work 
of academics. He worries, for instance, that funding by pharmaceutical companies is placing 
some  academics  in  a  position  where  they  may  be  biased  in  the  way  they  evaluate  new 
products. He cites examples where universities have punished researchers who have found 
unfavorable results which might hurt the university‟s funding. 
 
The new relationship with the private sector and the possible licensing of university research 
work have raised a new set of questions about the role that universities should play in research 
development in society. 
 
C.  Public Funding 
 
As mentioned earlier public funding of universities varies dramatically across countries. This 
funding also takes a variety of forms. These include direct support for operations in publically 
                                                 
24 An important exception is some work done for the defense department and intelligence agencies..    supported  institutions,  scholarships  and  student  loan  programs,  and  research  support.  An 
important question is how much control of university operations should government exercise 
over universities if government funds are used to support their operations?  
 
If one envisions a decentralized higher educational system as a kind of Adam Smith world, then 
universities should have discretion over key decisions, and the government would provide a 
framework within which universities compete. Smith‟s world was, of course, a world of private 
sector  actors  which  did  not  receive  public  funding.  This  suggests  a  conflict  between  a 
decentralized system and a system which receives public funding where public agencies want 
to hold recipients of public funding accountable for their expenditures of public monies.  
 
In  the  US  states  contribute  most  of  the  direct  assistance  to  public  universities.  There  is 
considerable  variation  among  states  in  terms  of  the  degree  of  control  that  they  attempt  to 
exercise  over  public  universities.
25  Burke  and  Mod arresi  (1999)  report  on  a  survey  of 
performance  funding  and  budgeting  by  states.  P erformance  funding,  using  a  series  of 
indicators, ties funding to specific achievements of universities. Performance budgeting ties 
funding to reports that universities submit for review. They found that sixteen states used 
performance funding and another  twenty-three used performance budgeting.   South Carolina 
implemented what was perhaps the most extreme system where “100 percent of the state‟s 
appropriation were to be based on such measures as quality of faculty, instructional quality, 
administrative efficiency, and the user-friendliness of the institution.”  (Heller, p.56). Reviews of 
the South Carolina system suggest that this budgeting system did not meet its legislative goals. 
 
The federal government, while providing much less direct funding of university operations, has 
also pressured universities by threatening to cut off federal funding. Two recent issues that 
might affect federal funds are policing of internet downloads by students and military recruiting 
on campus. The latter issue relates to the military‟s policies towards gays and lesbians.  
 
Another issue that has received less attention is changes in the university accreditation process. 
The Bush administration has been pushing for testing of college students in ways similar to the 
No Child Left Behind Law which institutes testing for K-12 students. 
 
Whether these government controls on the activities of universities are appropriate depends on 
whether  universities  are  more  likely  to  act  appropriately  without  these regulations  than  with 
them. In other words, do regulations do more harm than good? It is very difficult to answer this 
question without a model of university behavior which provides a clearer picture of how well 
universities meet social objectives without these regulations. 
 
D. Private Giving 
 
An important reason that, especially private universities, can provide an education which costs 
far more than the tuition that students pay is private giving. Historically private giving has been a 
more important source of revenue for private universities, but public universities now have large 
endowments  as  well.  The  University  of  Texas  System  ($15  billion)  and  the  University  of 
Michigan  ($7  billion)  now  have  some  of  the  largest  endowments  in  the  US.  In  1989  total 
university endowments in the US were about $69 billion: in 2007 the total was more than $400 
billion.  The  distribution  of  endowments  across  universities  is  very  unequal.  The  top  ten 
universities in terms of endowments have $143 billion and the top thirty have more than half of 
all endowments funds (NACUBO 2008). 
                                                 
25 The Dartmouth Case of 1819 established the independence of private universities. (Heller, 2004)    
This wide dispersion of endowments has created a very uneven competition for universities. 
Harvard has the country‟s largest endowment, approximately $35 billion; approximately double 
third  place  Stanford‟s  endowment.  Income  from  Harvard‟s  endowment  represented  33%  of 
Harvard‟s  operating  expenses  of  $3.2  billion  in  the  2006-2007  academic  year  and  was  the 
largest single source of funds for operations (Harvard, 2007). As such it represented only a 3% 
payout from the university‟s endowment.
26 
 
As endowments have grown, Congress has been concerned about how this money is being 
spent by colleges. The income earned by higher education institutions is not presently taxed. In 
response to these pressures Harvard has decided to provide more sch olarship assistance to 
students who families make under $180,000 a year. Families would not have to pay more than 
10% of their income in tuition.  This is expected to   cost Harvard about $20 million -  a trivial 
amount compared to their endowment income. Brown  University which has an endowment of 
$2.8 billion (less than one-tenth of Harvard‟s) would find these costs much harder to bear. 
 
IV.      A  Utility  Maximization  Problem  with  a  Revenue 
Constraint 
 
Since a university is a non-profit organization with goals that it wishes to achieve, it is possible 
to define the problem as a utility maximization problem with a revenue constraint where the 
revenue constraint is defined by the resources the university is able to obtain from student 
tuition, research funding, public funds and endowment income.
27 
 
Thus the problem can be stated as: 
 
 
Max U(Ranking (pr), pr)) 
 






s.t.  B =  T  +  R  + P  +  E 
 
 
where B is the total budget, T is tuition revenue, R is research revenue, P is public funding and 
E is endowment income. 
 
The  problem  is  made  more  complex  by  the  relationships  that  exist  between  rankings  and 
department  prestige  and  the  budget  constraint.  Because  of  competition  in  the  market  for 
students,  tuition  rates  are  largely  determined  by  market  forces  so  universities  can  increase 
tuition revenue only by increasing the number of students. Other revenue sources, however, 
can be influenced by prestige factors. 
                                                 
26 Congress is considering a law which would force colleges to pay out 5% of their endowment each year.  If 
Harvard paid out 5%, then the operating budget would receive $1.75 billion or more than half of the fiscal year 2006 
-07 expenditures. 
27 We have simplified the problem in a serious way.  Many universities obtain revenues from selling other services 
(i.e. medical services and sports entertainment.    Medical services in particular can be an important source of 
revenue that can support other activities on campus.  We leave out these considerations to make the model more 
tractable.  
Research revenue can be increased by having a more prestigious academic department. If this 
department is in an area where there is considerable outside funding available, then building the 
reputation  of  that  department  can  have  a  considerable  effect  on  university  revenues.  Thus 
universities have an incentive to invest more in the prestige of departments which have outside 
sources of revenue, and provide fewer internal resources to department that do not bring in 
outside money. 
 
With the ability to license new discoveries universities will also have an increased interest in 
funding research ventures which have potential market value.  
 
Thus we could write a research revenue as function of pr where the partials with respect to the 












i reflect the potential of marketing research results through licensing or other corporate 
relationships where not just the researcher, but also the university receives financial rewards.   
For many departments the partial here is likely to be zero. 
 
Public funding can also be sensitive to the reputation of the university although the prestige of 
individual  departments  may  be  less  important  than  the  overall  reputation  of  the  university.  
Public  funding  of  universities  is  a  big  budget  item  for  many  state  governments  and  public 
funding  can  fluctuate  significantly  along  with  state  revenues.
28  A simple function describing 
public funding would include these factors: 
 
P (pr, SB) 
 
where SB represented the condition of state budgets. Private institutions also receive some 
state funding but they are much less reliant on these funds. 
 
Endowments  also  depend  on  the  reputation  of  the  university,  but  oth er  factors  are  also 
important.  Universities can be sensitive to future donors as part of the admission process. 
Remaining in contact and find ing ways for successful graduates to participate in university 
affairs can also be a way to encourage private giving. 
 
The return on investments is also a determinant of endowment growth. Like any other investor 
there is a tradeoff between risk and return. While it is difficult to assess the risks universities are 
taking with the endowment funds, it is interesting to note that endowments in excess of $1 billion 
in 2007 had 30% of their endowments in either hedge funds, private equity or venture capital. 
This compared with a total of 10.1% in these categories for institutions with endowments in the 
$50 – 100 million range (NACUBO, 2008). 
 
While  there  is  no  simple  description  of  the  factors  affecting  endowment  levels,  and  thus 
endowment  income  for  operating  expenses,  two  factors  seem  to  play  the  largest  role:  
investment returns and private giving. The latter is influenced by prestige so: 
 
                                                 
28 State funding per full time equivalent unit (FTE) in 2005 was its lowest level in 25 years.   It has risen somewhat 
since then but is still at a low level for this period. (SHEEO, 2008)  The future does not look bright as states struggle 
with other increasing demands. E (r, pr) 
 
where r is the investment return on the endowment portfolio. 
 
This problem can now be formally solved, but this would still leave open the question of whether 
a decentralized university system would efficiently meet social needs. This question can only be 
answered by analyzing the system as a whole. 
 
V.  System Effects 
 
We do not attempt to formally solve this problem for the system effects, although this would be 
nice. Our approach at this point is to ask how such a university is likely to respond to changes in 
its environment, for example, increases in students enrolling in higher education, or shifts in 
society‟s needs for training in new areas. 
  
a) Student Enrollments 
 
As Winston (2001) has argued, private universities which provide a large subsidy to students 
(i.e.  cost  far  exceeds  tuition)  have  little  incentive  to  respond  to  higher  demand  for  higher 
education. The statistics in the US bear this out. As Figure 1 illustrates enrollments in higher 
education  have  grown  dramatically  since  the  1960s.  In  1961  there  were  just  over  4 million 
students enrolled in higher education; by 2004 there were over  17 million. In 1961 60%  of 
students were enrolled in public institutions; by 2004 75% are enrolled in public institutions. If 




Figure 1:  Higher Education Enrollments in the US 
 
 
Source:  Digest of Education, p. 280, Department of Education 
 
 
The nonprofit nature of most higher education institutions also raises questions about entry and 
exit of schools. While exiting may be a function of financial considerations, entering a non-profit 
sector will be motivated by other concerns. Because of the wide diversity of higher educational 
institutions in the US,  it is hard to determine what motivates  leaders to open new schools. 
Religion is one factor. For example, the number of religious affiliated schools expanded from 
774 in 1980 to 922 in 1990. From 1960 to 2004 the number of private schools grew from 1321 to 2516 and the number of public institutions increased from 695 to 1700.
29 When compared 
with the enrollment figures, it is clear that most of the additional seats in public institutions came 
from  expanding  the  siz e of  colleges and universities.  For  private  schools  the  number  of 
institutions increased by 90% and enrollments increased by 160%. 
 
A problem with these general figures is that they include all kinds of post-secondary schools. A 
more focused look at colleges and universities that are ranked  classified by the Carnegie 
Classification system as research direct universities and liberal arts colleges (680 schools) 
provides a somewhat different snapshot of the dynamics affecting higher education.  Of the 76 
schools that were founded since World War II, 30 were public schools,  46 were private schools 
and 33 of these had a religious affiliation.
30 Sixteen of the new campuses were in California. 
 
If we look further at this set of schools 61 were founded between the end of World War I and the 
end of World War II or an average of 2.3 schools a year vs . 1.3 schools a year during the 
explosion of enrollments during the post-World War II period. 
 
Exit also occurs. Between 1970 and 2004, 539 schools closed their doors, this included branch 
campuses. Of these 495 of these were private schools of which 256 were two -year programs. 
Only 5 four-year public schools (or campuses) closed during this period. 
 
These statistics leave open the question of how a decentralized higher education system that 
lacks a profit motive is responding to changing educational needs.  
 
b)  Shifting Needs in Society 
 
While an important goal for a higher education system is to educate informed citizens, higher 
education also prepares people for professional employment. These needs change over time 
and higher educational institutions need to adjust to new professional environments. 
 
Table 1 
                                                 
29 The 1960 figures do not include branch campuses while the 2004 figures do. so the figures are not entirely 
comparable. 
30 Three of the thirteen non-religiously affiliated schools were the Claremont Colleges:  Claremont McKenna,  Pitzer  
and Harvey Mudd.   A fourth was Hampshire College (1965) which was started by nearby small colleges which 
wanted to expand but wanted to maintain their small size. Bachelor's degrees conferred by degree-granting institutions,
 selected disciplines for years  1970-71 and 2005-06
Discipline division 1970-71 2005-06 Growth Growth of
Rate PhDs
   Total Number of Degrees………………………............. 839,730 1,485,242 77% 75%
Business ........................................................... 115,396 318,042 176% 121%
Social sciences and history ........................................ 155,324 161,485 4% 7%
Education ............................................... 176,307 107,238 -39% 26%
Health professions and related clinical sciences ............................ 25,223 91,973 265% 1276%
Psychology ......................................... 38,187 88,134 131% 130%
Visual and performing arts ............................... 30,394 83,297 174% 123%
Communication, journalism, and related programs .............................................. 10,324 73,955 616% 218%
Biological and biomedical sciences ....................................... 35,683 69,178 94% 61%
Engineering ........................................... 45,034 67,045 49% 101%
English language and literature/letters ....................... 63,914 55,096 -14% 163%
Computer and information sciences ........................... 2,388 47,480 1888% 1006%
Lib arts & sciences, general studies,  and humanities 7,481 44,898 500% 163%
Security and protective services .................................... 2,045 35,319 1627% 7900%
Parks, recreation, leisure, and fitness studies ................... 1,621 25,490 1472% 9600%
Agriculture and natural resources .................. 12,672 23,053 82% 10%
Public administration and social services ........................ 5,466 21,986 302% 305%
Physical sciences and science technologies ............................. 21,410 20,318 -5% 4%
Foreign languages, literatures, and linguistics ......................... 20,988 19,410 -8% -1%
Mathematics and statistics ........................................ 24,801 14,770 -40% 8%
Philosophy and religious studies .................................. 8,149 11,985 47% 4%
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National 
Center for Education Statistics, Higher 
Education General Information Survey (HEGIS), 
"Degrees and Other Formal Awards Conferred" 
surveys, 1970-71 through 1985-86; and 1990-91   
 
Table 1 illustrates the changes in the awarding of bachelors‟ degrees in the largest academic 
disciplines. As can be seen in the table, there have been significant shifts in the areas where 
students have chosen to study. In terms of the number of student, the biggest changes have 
been  in  the  number  of  business  students  and  students  studying  in  health  related  fields.  In 
percentage terms the biggest shifts have been in computer science and security services which 
have been rapidly expanding areas in the economy during this period. The largest decline has 
been in training for education. The largest declines occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
in about equal proportions for men and women. The number of teachers in elementary and 






Recently the Department of Education did a longitudinal study of the class of 1993 (Department 
of Education, 2008). Table 2, which is taken from the report, shows salary patterns for different 
majors for the graduating class of 1993 over a 10 year period. To the extent that these salary 
differentials reflect demand in the economy for people with this training, one can see why the 
enrollment patterns in Table 1 have evolved the way they have. Business and computer science 
majors have done very well, while education majors have fallen behind salaries for other majors. 
 
While these shifts reflect the interests of students, it is more difficult to find statistics on how 
universities have responded to these changes in terms of their internal staffing. Having tenured 
faculty can make these shifts particularly challenging. What can be observed is a major shift 
towards part-time faculty which gives the university more flexibility and reduces salary costs. 
 
An  indirect  measure  is  how  many  PhDs  are  graduating  in  different  fields  and  how  this  is 
changing over  time. The last  column in Table 1 shows the change in the number of PhDs 
granted  between  1970  and  2004.  Some  of  the  changes  are  very  close  to  the  changes  in 
bachelor degrees granted; others are not. Most reflect the size and relative direction of changes 
in undergraduate enrollments. Some of the differences may reflect changes in the way that 





This paper is intended only to be a beginning of a discussion of the issues surrounding higher 
education. We described some of the features of the decentralized higher education system in 
the US and used this as a basis for thinking about how a better decentralized higher education 
system  could  be  organized.  Without  a  more  formal  model  of  how  competition  in  a  higher 
education system might function, we were only able to present some general facts about how 
higher education in the US is responding to the needs of society. We were able to say almost 
nothing about the efficiency of such a system and without a more formal model we were not able to make policy recommendations for improving the system. These are serious deficiencies 
in our knowledge about a sector which plays such a central role in our society.  
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